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CASE NOTES
Contracts—Indemnity—Architect's Duty to Supervise—Employer's
Duty to Indemnify Despite Workmen's Compensation Act.—Miller v.
DeWitt.'—An architectural firm, De\Vitt-Amdal and Associates, contracted
with the Maroa Community Unit School District Number 2 to design and
supervise the remodeling of a school gymnasium. Fisher-Stoune, Incorporated,
a builder, contracted with the school district to perform the construction. The
contract between the architect and the school district provided, in part, that
the architect would supervise the work, endeavoring to guard against defects
and deficiencies on the part of the builder. The architect's supervision was to
be distinguished from continuous personal superintendence, however, and he
was not a guarantor of the performance of the builder's contract. 2 The latter's
contract with the school district provided, in part, that the builder must take
precautions for the safety of his employees and that the architect had general
supervision of the work and authority to stop the work to insure the proper
execution of the contracts There was no contract between the architect and
the builder.
The architect's material and artistic specifications did not include speci-
fications for the temporary shoring of the gymnasium roof, nor was the load
that would be placed upon the shores computed. During construction, the
builder shored up temporary trusses in an unsafe manner and the roof of the
gymnasium collapsed, injuring plaintiffs, Miller and two other employees of
the builder. Since the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act protects the
1. 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
2 Id. at 280, 226 N.E.2d at 635.
3 Id. at 281-83, 226 N.E.2d at 636-37. The pertinent provisions of the builder's con-
tract with the school district are as follows:
"12. Protection of Work and Property.
. . . .
"The Contractor shall take all necessary precautions for the safety of em-
ployees on the work, and shall comply with all applicable provisions of Federal,
State, and Municipal safety laws and building codes to prevent accidents or
injury to persons on, about or adjacent to the premises where the work is
being performed. He shall erect and properly maintain at all times, as required
by the conditions and progress of the work, all necessary safeguards for the
protection of workmen and the public ...; and he shall designate a responsible
member of his organization on the work, whose duty shall be the prevention
of accidents. The name and position of any person so designated shall be
reported to the Architect by the Contractor.
. . . .
"38. Architect's Status:
"The Architect shall have general supervision and direction of the work....
He has authority to stop the work when ever such stoppage may be necessary to
insure the proper execution of the Contract.
. . . .
"55. Protection:
• * *
"Bracing, Shoring and Sheeting: The Contractor shall provide all bracing,
shoring and sheeting as required for safety and for the proper execution of the
work, and have same removed when the work is completed.
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builder-employer from suit by his employêes for their injuries, 4 the plaintiffs
sued the architect. Their claim for damages was based on the architect's
alleged negligent supervision of the construction work. They alleged that the
architect had a duty to prevent the builder from carrying out the work in a
faulty manner and that the architect had failed to perform this duty. 5 The
defendant contended that a supervising architect has neither the right nor
the duty to control the methods used by the builder, but has only the duty to
see that the construction, when completed, meets the plans and specifications
contracted for by the owner. In addition to this defense, the architect filed
a third-party complaint against the builder for indemnity, alleging that the
builder was actively negligent and that the architect's negligence, if any,
was passive.° The Illinois trial court dismissed the architect's third-party
complaint on motion by the builder before any evidence was heard, and the
jury found the architect liable in damages for the builder's employees' injuries.
The intermediate appellate court affirmed both the judgment against the
architect and the dismissal of his claim against the builder? On appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court HELD: An architect who has the contractual duty
of general supervision and the right to stop work to insure the proper execu-
tion of a builder's contract with the owner has a corresponding duty to stop
work if he knows or should know of an unsafe condition during a portion of
the work. If the part of the work being done by the builder is a major part
of the entire operation and one that involves obvious hazards, d jury could
find from the evidence that the architect is guilty of negligence in failing to
inspect and watch over that particular aspect of the work. 8 With respect to
the lower court's dismissal of the architect's third-party complaint against
the builder, however, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The court held
that a passively negligent third party tortfeasor can recover indemnity from
an actively negligent employer, even though the employer is covered by a
workmen's compensation act which provides that compensation paid under
the act to the injured employee shall be the measure of responsibility of a
covered employer on account of such injury.°
The Miller case is significant in that it deals with two-issues of sub-
stantial concern to architects and builders and, indeed, to any party who is
held liable to an injured employee when the latter's negligent employer is
4 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1967).'
5 37 III. 2d at 276, 226 N.E.2d at 633. Plaintiffs also alleged, and the Illinois court
agreed, that the architects were persons "having charge" 'of the work under the Illinois
Structural Work Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 60, 69 (Smith-Hurd 1967), so as to be
liable for the plaintiffs' injuries. Whether the architects were persons in charge of the
work or whether the shoring was within the purview of the Structural Work Act are
issues beyond the scope of this note. •
Illinois law recognizes the justice of requiring a person whose actual negligence
has been the proximate cause of an injury to pay damages. It thus permits recovery by
a wrongdoer who has only passively allowed a condition to arise against an active wrong-
doer who actually did the act causing the injury. Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fire-
proofing Co., 310 El. 331, 337, 141 N.E. 739, 741 (1923).
7 Miller v. DeWitt, 59 III. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965).
. 8 37 Ill. 2d at 286, 226 N.E.2d at 639.
9 Id. at 289-90, 226 N.E.2d at 640-41. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.11 (Smith-Hurd
1967).
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covered by a workmen's compensation act. Of interest to architects and build-
ers is the question whether an architect can be liable for damages sustained by
a builder's employee, resulting from the builder's negligence in carrying out
methods of construction, on the basis of a provision in the builder's contract
with the owner giving the architect authority to stop work in order to insure
the proper execution of the contract. Of general interest is the question
whether a third party found liable to another's injured employee can recover
indemnity from the latter's employer notwithstanding the existence of a
workmen's compensation act. Both issues are the subject of legal uncertainty
and present difficult questions of fairness and justice to the parties concerned.
In Miller, the court recognized the general rule that an architect's duty
of "supervision," owed to the owner with whom he has contracted, is the duty
to see that the building, when constructed, meets the plans and specifications
contracted for 1 0 The majority found, however, that where the architect had
not only a duty of supervision but also the authority to stop work to insure
the proper execution of the contract, the architect, therefore, had a duty to
interfere and stop the work if he knew or should have known that the builder
was using unsafe construction methods. The court admitted that the architect
had no duty to specify the method the builder would use in shoring, but held
that he had a right to insist upon a safe and adequate use of that method.
Because of this right, the court imposed on the architect a corresponding duty
to stop the work until the unsafe condition had been remedied. Breaching
such a duty, he would be liable, not only to the owner, but also to persons who
could foreseeably be injured by such breach!' The court believed that the
shoring and removal of the old roof was a major part of the remodeling job
which involved obvious'hazards to others, and since this process was of such
importance, the jury could find from the evidence that the architect was
guilty of negligence in failing to inspect and oversee this operation.
The dissenting judge could not read into the contract a duty which was
not imposed by it. He felt that the architect's contract here was a standard
form, that supervision was limited to results',and that continuous personal
nsuperintendence of the builder's methods was ot envisioned. It was his view
that the architect did not contract to be present at all phases of construction
since, according to the contract, a clerk-of-the-works was to be selected and
was to piovide personal continuous superintendence. 12
Contract clauses giving to architects the right to stop work are rarely
discussed in determining an architect's liability though they frequently appear
in contract documents relating to construction. Courts have ordinarily dealt
with an architect's liability by simply defining the word "supervision." 12 A
determination is made as to what duties are imposed upon an architect under
contract terms such as general supervision and adequate supervision of the
work. Generally, the term "supervision" imposes on the architect a duty to
10 37 Ill. 2d at 284, 226 N.E.2d at 638 .
11 Id. at 285, 226-N.E.2d at 638-39,
12 Id. at 293, 226 N.E.2d at 642-43.
n See, e.g., Day v: National United States Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 304, 128
So. 2d 660, 666 (1961) ; Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 545, 255 P.2d
352, 357 (1953).
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the owner to see that the construction project is completed in accordance with
the plans and specifications of the contract." Therefore, it is a supervision of
results and not of means or methods used to attain that result.'' The archi-
tect should inspect during construction and upon completion only with respect
to compliance with the architectural plans and use of proper materials. 16
In supervising the results of the builder's work, the architect will be held
liable to the owner if he negligently and incorrectly determines that the
results of the work are proper." He will also be held liable to third parties
for any injuries they may sustain as a consequence of his negligent deter-
mination that the completed construction is in conformity with the contract
specifications. This is so despite the absence of privity of contract with the
injured parties. 12 It should be kept in mind, however, that the courts are
almost unanimous in declaring that an architect under a duty of supervision
has no power or control over the contractor's means or methods of reaching
the desired result and, thus, has no duty to supervise the contractor's
methods. 19
In Miller, the Illinois court was faced with a case of injury to an em-
ployee of the builder caused by the builder's negligent use of a method of
construction, namely, the negligent use of the temporary truss. The only
function of the temporary truss was to support the roof until the new support
was completed. It was not properly part of the materials or specifications set
forth in the architect's plans but merely a technique utilized by the builder
to accommodate those plans. As such, it does not appear to be so related to
the end result of the construction as to call for an architect's supervision.
The Illinois court recognized that an architect has no duty to specify
the method a builder should use 2U However, it found that the right-to-stop-
work clause gave the architect the right to specify a safe and adequate use
of the builder's methods. 21 On the basis of this right, the court imposed a
duty on the architect to inspect and to stop work if the architect knew, or
should have known, that the builder's methods were unsafe. It seems doubtful
that a right to stop work creates a duty to stop work. A duty involves no
discretion on the part of the person owing it; it must be carried out or there
is a breach On the other hand, a right gives a party discretion as to whether
he shall exercise it or not. If he does not exercise the right there is no breach of
a right. The dissenting judge in Miller conceded that the architect had the
right to insist upon a safe and adequate use of the builder's methods, but
11 Cases cited note 13 supra. See also Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson,
Inc., 242 Ark. 97, —, 412 S.W.2d 626, 631 (1967); Clinton v. Boehm, 139 App. Div. 73,
75, 124 N.Y.S. 789, 792 (1910).
15 See cases cited notes 13 & 14 supra.
16 Day v. National United States Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 304, 128 So. 2d
660, 666 (1961).
17 See, e.g., Pastorelli v. Associated Eng'rs, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159 (D.R.I. 1959).
19 Id. See generally Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143
N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
19 Cases cited notes 13 & 14 supra.
25 37 III. 2d at 285, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
21 Id.
760
CASE NOTES
stated that "to parlay that 'right' into a duty is neither consistent with
generally accepted usage nor contemplated by the contract." 22
An architect's liability to persons, not party to his contract with an
owner, is clearly related to his breach of a contractual duty to the owner. If
negligent, the architect is properly liable to anyone who foreseeably might
have been injured. The right-to-stop-work clause, however, involves a delega-
tion of authority to the architect, a right as opposed to a duty. The Miller
court did not seem troubled, however, with this distinction between right
and duty. Its sole reference to the distinction appears in its conclusion that
the architect "had the right and corresponding duty to stop the work until
the unsafe condition had been remedied."'
Thus, the Miller court found that the right-to-stop-work clause in the
builder's contract with the owner increased the normal extent of the architect's
duty of supervision. The right-to-stop-work clause is found in many such
contracts, and is considered to be merely a tool with which the architect can
enforce against the builder his general supervisory powers as to materials
and specifications.24 There appears to be no reason why the clause should
now be held to place a greater burden of supervision on the architect.
Only one other jurisdiction has employed the right-to-stop-work clause
in deciding a case similar to Miller. In Erhart v. Hummonds, 25 the Arkansas
court used the right-to-stop-work clause to impose liability on the architects.
But in that case, the architects were specifically employed by the owner to
guard its interests by supervising all aspects of the construction of the build-
ing in addition to their normal architectural duties. They were in fact paid
a separate fee to conduct such supervision. 26 Another and crucial distinction
between the Erhart case and Miller exists in the fact that the architects in
Erhart knew of the unsafe condition which caused the injuries. While they
did inform the contractor, he did not stop the work. 27
The Erhart case has apparently been limited by the later case of Walker
v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc.28 This case dealt with the exact
contract used in Miller, and also concerned a method of the builder that had
caused injuries to his employees. The Arkansas court did not even discuss the
right-to-stop-work clause, but limited its analysis to the term "supervision."
The original decision, as in Miller, stated that the question of what duties the
term "supervision" imposed on the architect was for the jury.29 On rehearing,
22 Id. at 293-94, 226 N.E.2d at 643.
23 Id. at 285, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
24 This clause is included in Article 38 of the American Institute of Architects
General Conditions which sets out the standard supervisory powers of the architect. This
is the exact provision that was contained in the Miller contracts. See Walker v. Witten-
berg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525, 527-28, 412 S.W.2d 621, 623 (1966).
28 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960).
28 Id. at 138, 334 S.W.2d at 872.
27 Id. at 141-42, 334 S.W.2d at 874 (dissenting opinion). Despite the architect's
separate fee for supervision and his knowledge of the unsafe condition, one judge dis-
sented on the ground that the contractor, and not the architect, was responsible for the
maintenance of safety precautions. Id.
28 241 Ark. 525, 412 S.W.2d 621 (1966), rev'd in part on rehearing, 242 Ark. 97,
412 S.W.2d 626 (1967).
20 241 Ark. at 530, 412 S.W.2d at 624
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however, the court decided that as a matter of law an architect haS no duty
to exercise control over a builder with respect to day-to-day safefy super-
vision despite the existence of a right-to-stop-work clause. ImpositiOn of such
a duty "must clearly appear from the terms of the agreement, the conduct of
the parties, or the nature of the work being performed." 30
Analysis of other provisions included in contracts such as the one in Miller
would seem to allow the conclusion that :the' owner does not expect the
architect to supervise safety precautions. In Miller, the architect's contract
with :the school district merely provided that, ith supervising the work, the
architect would "endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and defidencies
in the work of the contractors ... . "31
 On dthe other hand, the contract between
the builder and the school district provides that the "Contractor shall take
all necessary precautions for the safety of employees . . . ." and "shall
erect and properly maintain at all times . . . all necessary safeguards for the
protection of workmen ... ," and "shall designate a responsible member of
his organization on the work, whose duty shall be the prevention of . ac-
cidents."32
The various contract provisions seem clearly to place the burden of
supervising material and artistic specifiCations on the architect and the
burden of supervising safety precautions on the builder. The fact that the
builder's contract with the school district authorizes the architect to stop
the work whenever such stoppage may be necessary to insure the proper
execution of the contract would not seem to alter this allocation of burden.
This clause delegates authority to the architect and it does not impose a
contractual obligation on him to be present every day in order to insure the
safety of the builder's employees. Bearing this out, the architect's contract
in Miller expressly provides that " [t] he supervision of an Architect is to
be distinguished from the continuous personal superintendence to be obtained
by the employment of a clerk-of-the-works." 33
One sentence of the contract language may offer some support for the
imposition of a duty to supervise safety on the architect. According to the
builder's contract, the identity of the person selected by the builder to pre-
vent accidents was to be reported to the architect. It could be argued that if
safety supervision was to be the builder's responsibility alone, the demand that
the architect be notified as to the identity of the person selected by the
builder to prevent accidents would be meaningless. 34 However, the very fact
that the architect is informed as to the existence of a safety supervisor em-
ployed by the builder would . seem to indicate the absence of a duty on the
architect's part to supervise safety of methods used.
A factor which lends'the strongest support to the Miller decision is the
finding of the court that the shoring procedure, i.e., the use of temporary
trusses to support the old roof while new supports were being located, was
3° 242 Ark. at 280, 412 S.W.2d at 630.
31 37 III. 2d at 281, 226 N.E.2d at 635.
32 Id., 226 N.E.2d at 636.
33 'Id., 226 N.E.2d at 635.
34 See Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 242 Ark. 97, —, 412 S.W.2d
626, 632 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
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a "major" and important phase of the entire remodeling operation." Indeed,
the court tries to limit its decision by saying that the architect need only
inspect and watch over major portions of the work which involve obvious
hazards to others." At first glance, it seems reasonable to contend that a
major operation involved in the construction project, even though it involves
only a method of construction, should come within the ambit of the architect's
general supervisory duty. If this were the case, however, the architect would
find himself suddenly faced with the task of supervising all methods of con-
struction employed by a builder which a court might consider major phases
of the entire operation. Such a situation could leave the architect with no
criterion as to what is "major" and what is "minor." A court may consider
major what the architect reasonably considers minor. Rather than speculate
and leave himself open to liability, the architect may feel obligated to inspect
all of the builder's work all of the time. Thus the role of the architect has
been expanded to include the functions of a safety engineer. To support such
an extension strong public policy must be demonstrated.
As a matter of policy, it may be felt that a builder will utilize safer
methods if he is aware that an architect is supervising his safety precautions.
On occasion, builders may use the most expedient method of construction
available at the expense of safety. It can be argued that an architect, super-
vising safety, could prevent such tactics. On the other hand, such a shifting
of the burden for safety may only leave the builder less willing to choose and
carry out methods of construction carefully. One must also return to the
pure impracticality of expecting that an architect will have the time or
inclination to place himself or his qualified representatives on all the jobs
in which he is involved, all the time work is being conducted. The task of
supervising the methods of construction employed by the builder is not the
function of an architect nor is he necessarily qualified. As to methods, the
builder is the expert and of necessity is on the job to insure its completion.
To impose such a function on the architect will almost certainly prove to be
an aggravation to the builder in that the latter will surely not appreciate
being overruled in his choice of particular methods of construction. Such
conflicts would produce costly delays and tense working conditions. The
possibility of interference by the architect with the builder's methods will
also make it difficult for builders to make accurate bids, since their bids are
necessarily based on use of their methods." Also, architects' fees are likely
to increase due to the potential liability to builder's employees and the in-
creased costs of supervision." To burden the architect with the traditional
responsibilities of the builder merely because the latter on occasion is negli-
gent in carrying out those responsibilities will not solve the problem of negli-
gence in construction methods nor, most likely, reduce the frequency of
its incidence.
35 37 III. 2d at 286, 226 N.E.2d at 639.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 294, 226 N.E.2d at 643 (dissenting opinion). See also Charles Meads &
Co. v. City of New York, 191 App. Div. 365, 370, 181 N.Y.S. 704, 707 (1920).
38 See Miller v. DeWitt, 37 III. 2d 294-95, 226 N.E.2d 630, 643 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
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Neither law nor policy seems to support the conclusion that the architect
in Miller had a duty to inspect the builder's construction methods or super-
vise his safety precautions. It is submitted that the proper way to find a duty
in these cases is to interpret the term "supervision" in the contracts involved,
in light of the express and implied duties clearly shown by the language of
the instrument. A duty should not, however, be implied from the mere
existence of authority in the architect to stop work if he finds that the builder
is not properly executing the contract. While the case might be different
should the contract incorporate by reference, or otherwise, specific require-
ments as to methods of construction, this was not the case in Miller.
Having decided that the architect was liable to the employees of the
builder, the Illinois court had to face "[p]erhaps the most evenly-balanced
controversy in all of compensation law . . . "22 That controversy centers
on whether a workmen's compensation act extinguishes the common law
right of indemnity. Common law indemnity shifts the entire loss from one
wrongdoer who has been compelled to pay damages, to the shoulders of
another wrongdoer who, for good reason, should bear it instead 9 0 In Miller,
the Illinois court decided that the right of a passively negligent tortfeasor
to recover indemnity from an actively negligent tortfeasor was not ex-
tinguished despite the fact that the actively negligent tortfeasor was an
employer covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 41
Most workmen's compensation acts provide that the employer's liability
on account of an employee's injury is exclusively fixed by the act. 42 This
"exclusive liability" is in place of any other liability whatsoever to the em-
ployee, his personal representatives, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages, at common law or otherwise.43 The purpose behind workmen's
compensation acts is to compensate employees injured on the job at stated
sums, fixed or to be fixed according to the act. The employee loses his right
to common law tort awards by a jury against his employer, and the employer
loses the defenses he had at common law of contributory negligence, assump-
tion of the risk, and the fellow-servant rule. However, both parties gain
because the employee is always assured of some payments, and the employer ,
is no longer open to high jury awards.
If, however, the employee is injured due to the negligence of a third
39 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 76.10 (1961).
40 W. Prosser, Torts § 48 (3d ed. 1964).
41 37 III. 2d at 289-90, 226 N.E.2d at 641.
42 See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 3601 (West Supp. 1967) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-10-5
to -6 (1953); N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 11 (McKinney 1965).
42 The Illinois Act provides that compensation under the Act "shall be the measure
of the responsibility" of a covered employer. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.11 (Smith-Hurd
1967). The Act further provides:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer or
his employees for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in
the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein pro-
vided, shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of
this Act, to anyone wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal repre-
sentatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for
such injury.
Id. § 138.5(a).
'764
CASE NOTES
party, he may forego the workmen's compensation payments and sue the
third party in tort. The problem arises when both the employer and a third
party are negligent. The employee then recovers from the third party and
the third party seeks contribution or indemnity from the employer." The
employer, in turn, pleads the special defense of the workmen's compensa-
tion act's exclusive liability clause. If the third party is allowed to recover
over from the employer, as in Miller, the employer has essentially become
liable for full tort damages on account of an employee's injury, even though
the workmen's compensation act supposedly limits such liability. It has
been said, therefore, that recovery-over accomplishes indirectly what cannot
be done directly and, therefore, evades the purpose of workmen's compensa-
tion legislation. 45
On the other hand, if the third party is not allowed to recover over
from the employer, he is being denied his common law right of indemnity
or, in some jurisdictions, his statutory right to contribution. 45 The third
party's problem is even more severe when he is not negligent at all, but is
held liable to the employee based on some concept of strict liability.
The Miller court, while recognizing the problem in allowing indemnity
against an employer covered by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act,
obviously sympathized with the predicament of the passively negligent third
party and applied the theory which allows a third party who was not actively
negligent to obtain indemnification from an employer who was actively
negligent.47 This theory, which certainly may properly be applied to situa-
tions not involving the Workmen's Compensation Act, holds that as between
active and passive tortfeasors, the primary liability for the damages ordinarily
rests upon the actively negligent tortfeasor because of the difference in the
kinds of negligence of the two. If the passive tortfeasor pays damages to
the injured person, he is discharging an obligation for which the active
tortfeasor is primarily liable, and, therefore, is entitled to indemnity from
him.48 The Miller court stated that "unless a third party who has not been
guilty of active negligence can succeed in an action against an employer
who has been guilty of active negligence, the third party will be made to
bear the ultimate burden of a loss which should fall on the employer.""
The Miller court apparently felt that this result was so inequitable as to
overcome the "exclusive liability" of the employer under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. This attitude was reinforced by the fact that under the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, if an employee recovers compensa-
44 Unlike contribution, which distributes the loss among tortfeasors by requiring
each to pay his proportionate share, indemnity shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor
who has been compelled to pay it, to the shoulders of another who should bear it Instead.
W. Prosser, supra note 40, § 48.
45 2 A. Larson, supra note 39, § 76.52.
46 The Miller court did not have to deal with the contribution problem because
there is no contribution among joint tortfeasors in Illinois. 37 El. 2d —, 226 N.E.2d 630,
641.
47 37 III. 2d at 288-89, 226 N.E.2d at 640.
49 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427, 429
(S.D. Fla. 1967); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 563,
75 S.E.2d 768, 771 (1953).
49 37 El. 2d at 289, 226 N.E.2d at 641.
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tion from his employer and subsequently recovers damages from a third
party, the employee must reimburse his employer in the amount of compensa-
tion received from him under the Act.° Thus the employer is fully indemni-
fied.
Many courts have had to deal with this controversy, but it seems that
the Miller decision goes farther than any, given the facts involved, in al-
lowing indemnity. In assessing the validity of the Miller decision, the case
law should be separated into two categories: (1) those cases in which, as
in Miller, there is no contractual relationship between the third party and
the employer, and (2) those cases in which a contract exists between the
third party and the employer.
In the first category of cases, involving no contractual relationship
between the third party and the employer, the third party is ordinarily denied
indemnity from the employer covered by a workmen's compensation act. 51 If
there is no contract, it is said that the obligation to indemnify springs from
the injury itself, and thus is on account of the injury, and the employer is
protected by the exclusive liability clause. 52
Another reason why an indemnity claim based on the active-passive
theory is generally denied is that jurisdictions which ordinarily apply this
theory require that the parties be joint tortfeasors having a common liability
to the injured party. However, there can be no common liability to the em-
ployee when the employer's liability is governed by a workmen's compensa-
tion act, and the third party's liability is based on common law negligence.
The employer and third party are not, in law, joint tortfeasors and the
passively negligent third party cannot discharge any common law obligation
of the actively negligent employer. 53 As Judge Learned Hand stated:
" [T] here is nobody of sure authority for saying that differences in the
degrees of fault between two tortfeasors will without more strip one of them,
if he is an employer, of the protection of 'a compensation act . . . . "54 The
Miller court applied the active-passive indemnity doctrine in favor of the third
party without reference to the common liability criteria. In so doing, the
Miller court relied on three lower Illinois appellate court decisions which it
felt were controlling.° An examination of these cases however, indicates that
they are distinguishable from the Miller situation in that the third party
seeking indemnity in those cases was an owner of property who had con-
tracted with the employer from whom it sought indemnity. Thus the three
cases really belong in the second category of indemnity cases; namely, those
5° Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (Smith-Hurd 1967).
51 E.g., White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., Inc., 225 F. Supp: 940, 944-45 (D.N.D.
1964); Slechta v. Great Northern Ry., 189 F. Supp. 699, 703 (ND. Iowa 1961), aff'd
sub nom. Great Northern Ry. v. Bartlett, 298 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1962); 2 A. Larson, supra
note 39, § 76.10 (Supp. 1968).
52 2 A. Larson, supra note 39, § 76.10 (Supp. 1968).
53 Cases cited note 51 supra.
54 Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F1d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951).
Krambeer v. Canning, 36 III. App. 2d 428, 184 N.E.2d 747 (1962); Boston v.
Old Orchard Business Dist., Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 324, 168 N.E.2d 52 (1960); Moroni v.
Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 III. App. 2d 534, 165 N.E.2d 346 (1960). •
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in which there is a contract between the third party and employer. A discus-
sion of this latter category is, therefore, relevant at this point.
In the most obvious situation, if there is a contract between the third
party and the employer which includes an express agreement by the latter
to indemnify the former, the third party can enforce this contract. This ap-
plies notwithstanding the employer's coverage under a workmen's compensa-
tion act." In the typical case, however, the contract between the parties
contains no such indemnification agreement. The leading case in this area
is the United States Supreme Court decision in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-
Atlantic S.S. Corp. 57
 The Court was confronted with an "exclusive liability"
clause in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, which
limited the employer's liability on account of any injury to an employee. 58
A shipowner had contracted with a .stevedore to have the latter repair his
ship. An employee of the stevedore was injured due to the negligence of
another employee and the injured employee sued and recovered from the
shipowner. The shipowner sought indemnity from the stevedore and the
Court allowed recovery reasoning that the employer, in performing his work
under the contract with the shipowner (third party), had a nonexpressed,
yet essential, obligation as part of the contract to perform the services in a
workmanlike way. 59
 Therefore, an obligation existed to indemnify the ship-
owner for damages sustained as a result of the nonperformance of the implied
duty to perform the work safely. The exclusive liability clause was not a
bar to the shipowner's claim for indemnity because he was suing on account
of the employer's contract with him, and not, on account of the injury to
the employee." While some jurisdictions have followed Ryan,61 a few have
rejected the Ryan reasoning because they feel that the wording of .their
compensation acts precludes indemnity under any circumstances.° 2
The three Illinois appellate court cases cited as support by the Miller
court were Ryan-type cases. In the earliest of the three cases, Moroni v.
Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 63
 a railroad (third party) entered into an agree-
ment with a contractor (employer) to have work done for the railroad. An
employee of the contractor-employer was injured and recovered from the
railroad. The railroad was allowed to recover indemnity from the employer
56 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132 (1956); see
2 A. Larson, supra note 39, § 76.41.
57 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
	 .
58 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
50 350 U.S. at 133-34. The Court dealt only with a contractual right to indemnity.
60 Id. at 130-32.
m E.g., McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323
S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959) ; Moroni v. Intrusion-Prepakt, Inc., 24 III. App. 2d 534, 165 N.E.2d
346 (1960) ; Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118 N.W.2d 559
(1962).
62 These courts hold that since the employer's. liability is fixed not only to the
employee, but to "anyone otherwise entitled to recover," the latter phrase must include
would-be indemnitees or the purpose of the compensation act would be obviated. E.g.,
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230 Md. 584, 589-90,
187 A.2d 864, 867 (1963); Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp.,.67 N.M.
137, 143, 353 P.2d 358, 362 (1960). See also Calvery v. Peak Drilling Co., 118 F. Supp.
335 (W.D. Okla. 1954). *.! . . .
63 24 Ill. App. 2d 534, 165 N.E.2d 346 (1960).
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despite the exclusive liability clause of the Illinois Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. The court discussed active-passive negligence, but grounded its
decision on the breach by the employer of an independent duty owed to the
third party railroad arising out of their contract. The Moroni court cited
Ryan for support." The Moroni court stated that only those who attempt
to recover from the employer through some relationship with the injured
employee are barred by the statute. Those who seek to recover on a duty
separate and apart from that owing to the injured employee are not barred."
The third party railroad was allowed to recover on the separate duty owed
to it by the employer arising out of their contract.
The other two cases cited by Miller rely heavily on Moroni, and both
involve contracts between the third party and the employer." The cases
used active-passive language, but ultimately were decided on the breach-of-
independent-duty theory since a duty arising out of the third party-employer
contract was breached by the employer in both cases. The active-passive
labels were apparently used to weigh the degree of breach by the employer
against the acts of the third party.
In Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co.,67 the Supreme
Court of the United States declared "that in the area of contractual indemnity
an application of the theories of 'active' or 'passive' as well as 'primary' or
'secondary' negligence is inappropriate." 68 The language used should be
"breach of implied obligation to perform work safely," i.e., breach of an inde-
pendent duty arising out of the contract." The Court pointed out, however,
that the conduct of the third party should be looked to in order to determine
if it constitutes "conduct on its part sufficient to preclude recovery." 70 The
Supreme Court has made no effort thus far to provide a working rule as to
what is required to constitute "conduct on its [the third party's] part suffi-
cient to preclude recovery." 71 It appears however, that the active-passive
criterion is still applicable though under a new name."
It is thus apparent that the use of the active-passive criterion in contract
cases, whether referred to in language of tort or contract, is not determina-
tive of its use in noncontract cases, such as Miller. The Miller court un-
justifiably relied on this theory and the three lower appellate court decisions
which made use of it.
While the Miller court discusses no other theory for allowing indemnity
to the third party architect, it is meaningful to examine briefly another ap-
proach to the problem, naively, the breach-of-an-independent-duty, not
arising out of a contract between the third party and the employer. This
theory seems to have originated in the case of Westchester Lighting Co. v.
64 Id. at 539, 165 N.E.2d at 349.
65 Id. at 544, 165 N.E.2d at 352.
86 Krambeer v. Canning, 36 Ill. App. 2d 428, 184 N.E.2d 747 (1962); Boston v.
Old Orchard Business Dist., Inc., 26 III. App. 2d 324, 168 N.E.2d 52 (1960).
67 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
68 Id. at 569.
69 Id. at 567.
7° Id.
71 2 A. Larson, supra note 39, § 76.10 (Supp. 1968).
72 Id.
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Westchester County Small Estates Corp." There the employer, a builder,
broke the lighting company's gas line and negligently enclosed the point of
fracture in a tile drain. The escaping gas asphyxiated an employee of the
employer, and the employee's administrator recovered judgment from the
third party lighting company. The third party sought indemnity from the em-
ployer who was covered by a compensation act. The court held that the act
was not a valid defense for the employer because the third party's cause of
action was based on the breach of an independent duty owed by the em-
ployer to the third party. The employer committed a tort against the
third party by breaking his gas line and this constituted a breach of the
duty of care owed to the third party. The employer's liability, therefore,
was on account of this breach and not on account of the employee's injury. 74
This theory has not been very successful in cases not involving contracts
between an employer and third party, probably for the reason that an inde-
pendent duty in such cases seldom exists. There is no reference in Miller to
any independent duty owing from the builder to the architect, nor is one
apparent.
The workmen's compensation acts do protect the employer from suit
"on account of any injury" to an employee. If the third party proceeds on an
active-passive indemnity theory, with no contract between the third party
and the employer, the suit against the employer for indemnity is actually
on account of the injury. Thus, the acts should be construed to preclude
indemnity in the absence of a contract between the parties or a breach of an
independent duty owing to the third party from the employer. As the Miller
case involved no contract between the builder and the architect, and as
the court found no independent duty owing from the former to the latter,
it is submitted that the court's reasoning was faulty, and its finding that the
architect could recover over from the builder-employer was not supported
by the present state of the law. It is not difficult to imagine that the majority
in Miller considers the liability of the employer under the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act to be too restricted and has sought to provide a judicial
remedy.
While the various workmen's compensation acts and the case law which
has interpreted those acts demonstrates the legally inaccurate result reached
by the Miller court, it is submitted that, as to the indemnity issue, the result
was equitable. The concept of common liability which has led many courts
to deny indemnity to third parties is a source of inequity. It precludes a
third party who was only slightly negligent from recovering anything from
the employer who actually caused the injury. Common liability should be
irrelevant in adjusting the rights of the third party and the employer. The
principal reason for denying recovery to the third party is that the courts
do not want to undermine the main purpose of the workmen's compensation
acts, namely, limited liability of an employer on account of an employee's
injury. However, the acts, themselves, do not explicitly cover the situation
involving the third party seeking indemnity. The acts only fix the rights
and duties of employers and employees, including those claiming under the
73 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
74 Id. at 179-80, 15 N.E.2d at 568-69.
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•employee, and should not affect rules of law between 'the employer and the
type of third party involved in Miller.75
The most convincing argument for allowing recovery by the third party
is that the third party receives nothing from the workmen's compensation
-acts, yet he must sacrifice a common law right because of them. Workmen's
compensation acts give benefits to both employers and employees which
they did not have at common law in exchange for some advantages they both
had at common law. 7° The third party indemnitee is not a party to this
mutual sacrifice and gain; and thus he should not lose any common law
rights because of it. 77 Either the act should leave the common law rights
of the third party and employer unaffected, or some corresponding gain
should be given the third party for the loss of his common law right to in-
demnity.
The question of who to protect, the third party or the employer, involves
policy considerations which the legislature should consider. It is a very. deli-
cate balance for a court to strike, and the legislatures 'of the various states
should settle the indemnity controversy one way or another. Two states, Texas
and California, have enacted additions to their compensation acts, which pre-
clude indemnification by a third party unless the employer and the third
party have a contract which expressly provides for indemnification. 78 Thus,
these two states have resolved the problem, albeit not happily for many, and
it is hoped that other states will follow suit.
' MICHAEL ALAN PARIS
Eminent Domain—Riparian Rights—Deprivation of Access to Naviga-
ble Waterway is Not Compensable.—Colberg v. State. 1—Plaintiffs,
Colberg, Incorporated, and Stephens Marine, Incorporated, own real property
in the city of Stockton, California, riparian to the Upper Stockton Channel.
For more than 60 years they have operated shipyards upon this property
for the construction and repair of yachts and ocean-going vessels. The Upper
Stockton Channel runs for about 5000 feet from within the confines of the
city of Stockton to a turning basin adjoining that-city's port. Ships and other
craft now using the Upper Stockton Channel can proceed to the turning
basin and from there to a navigable tidal waterway, formed by the Stockton
Deep Water Ship Channel and the San Joaquin River. This waterway ex-
tends from the port of Stockton to San Francisco Bay and the open sea.
In order to improve its freeway system., the State of California proposed
to construct twin stationary freeway bridges across the Upper Stockton
Channel between plaintiffs' property and the turning basin.2 The vertical
' 75 See American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950).
76 Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349,'363-65, 63 N.W.2d 355, 364-65 (1954).
77 2 A. Larson, supra note 39, § 76.52.
78 Cal. Lab Code 3864 (West Supp. 1967); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306,
§ 3 (1967).
1 — Cal. 2d —, 432 P.2d 3; 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949
(1968). -
2 Pursuant to federal law, the state applied to the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief of Engineers for a permit to build such bridges. 33 U.S.C. §- 525(b) (1964). Ap-
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